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the reduction of poverty and the enhancement of economic growth
the fundamental objectives of lending operations in its poorest mem-
ber countries. This paper studies the spending and absorption of aid
in PRGF-supported programs, verifies whether the use of aid is pro-
grammed to be smoothed over time, and analyzes how considerations
about macroeconomic stability influence the programmed use of aid.
The paper shows that PRGF-supported programs permit countries to
utilize all increases in aid within a few years, showing smoothed use
of aid inflows over time. Our results reveal that spending is higher
than absorption in both the long-run and short-run use of aid, which
is a robust finding of the study. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates
that the long-run spending exceeds the injected increase of aid inflows
in the economy. In addition, the paper finds that the presence of a
PRGF-supported program does not influence the actual absorption or
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1 Introduction
Aid is a useful tool that facilitates the transfer of resources from one country
to another. It enables recipient countries - predominantly developing coun-
tries - to increase consumption and investment. Aid provides an opportunity
to reduce poverty, increase the standard of living and generate sustainable
economic growth. However, concern for the effective utilization and manage-
ment of aid dollars in recipient countries has recently been expressed. The
imperative to employ aid inflows adequately may stress the administrative
capacity of governments. In addition, volatile aid flows create problems of
financial management and debt sustainability in the future.
Unlike the international flow of capital, aid money is initially held by the
central bank. Governments then can decide whether or not to increase pub-
lic spending by running a greater fiscal deficit. At the same time, central
banks can choose whether or not to absorb aid inflows by selling aid dollars
and widening current account deficits. Although most of the aid literature
assumes that absorption and spending of aid is equivalent, spending could
be different from absorption due to the lack of stark agreement and coor-
dination between the government and the central bank. Such asymmetry
between spending and absorption could have quite adverse macroeconomic
consequences (Berg et al. 2005).
Questions could therefore arise regarding the advice offered by the IMF
to their member countries about the use of aid inflows. Further issues
could arise on how considerations of aid volatility, capacity constraints and
macroeconomic stability could shape these recommendations. To address
these questions, we took as a case the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facil-
ity (PRGF) program, an IMF-supported aid program that plays a catalytic
role in unlocking aid dollars to achieve poverty reduction and growth en-
hancement. The objective of this study is to estimate the programmed
spending and absorption of aid for PRFG arrangements. Placing the em-
phasis on programmed spending rather than actual spending, this study
estimates how much spending and absorption is determined by the program
design in countries that have a PRGF in place. Furthermore, this study
studies whether or not actual spending and absorption is affected by the
PRGF program.
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A pioneering study on estimating programmed spending and absorption of
a PRFG-supported program has been undertaken by Dudine et al. (2008).
The estimation used in their paper predominantly used pooled estimation
techniques which created biased estimations due to the presence of lagged
dependent term as one of the regressors in the model. Nevertheless, by using
the same dataset, the present study has improved on the estimations of
Dudine et al. (2008) and is able to provide efficient estimates and additional
insights to this area of study.
This study uses the IMF spending and absorption dataset in estimating re-
duced form models. The dataset contains data from staff reports concerning
requests for, or reviews of, all PRGF programs that were approved during
the period 1999-2007. The dataset is an unbalanced panel data from 369
program documents of 51 developing countries which allows tracking of the
IMF’s projections and economic programming. If the IMF employs any rule
that suggests to countries how aid dollars should be spent and absorbed,
this dataset would allow such a rule to be deduced. Some variables in the
dataset have been collected from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) to
control for other variables that are not generally reported in the program
documents.
The study demonstrates that PRGF-supported programs permit countries
to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, showing smoothed use of aid
inflows over time. Our results reveal that spending is higher than absorption
in both the long-run and short-run use of aid, which is a robust finding of
the study. Furthermore, the study finds that the long-run spending exceeds
more that the injected increase of aid into the economy. In contrast, we
find weak evidence of profound influence of other control variables on the
spending and absorption of aid. Finally, the study finds that the presence
of a PRGF-supported program does not influence the actual absorption or
spending of aid.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 elucidates the concept of ab-
sorption and spending, and the macroeconomic consequences of aid inflows
to developing countries. Section 3 describes the PRGF program of IMF to
its member countries. Section 4 introduces the key elements of the method-
ological framework of the estimations. Section 5 gives a brief description of
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the dataset and control variables used in this study. Section 6 presents the
estimation results and section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
The macroeconomic impact of aid inflows typically depends on the pol-
icy choices of government authorities. Specifically, the interaction of fiscal,
monetary and exchange rate policy shapes the use and impact of aid in the
recipient countries. To facilitate the understanding of this interaction, two
useful concepts of ‘Absorption’ and ‘Spending’ have been introduced by Berg
et al. (2007) where the current account response is measured by a ratio of
aid absorption and the fiscal response is measured by a ratio of aid spend-
ing (Dudine et al. 2008). Applying Berg et al. (2007), Aiyar and Ruthbah
(2008) and Hansen and Headey (2009), we used an accounting framework
utilizing the balance of payments and the national accounting system, in-
stead of originating a theoretical model to identify the mediums by which
aid inflows have an effect on macroeconomic aggregates.
2.1 Absorption
Using the balance of payments system, aid inflows in the form of grants
are booked as a current transfer on the record of current accounts whilst
loans are booked on the capital account. Hence, using the simple balance of
payments identity we can express the following equations
CAB t + KAB t = ∆Rt. (1)
Where
CAB t = (Xt −Mt) +Wt − (itLt−1 + rtDt−1) +Agt , (2)
and
KAB t = ∆L
0
t + (A
l
t −Art ). (3)
In equation 1, CAB is the current account balance, KAB is the capital
account balance and R is the foreign reserves. The current account balance
is specified in equation 2, as the net export (export X, minus import M)
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plus net private transfers W (mostly remittances and worker compensations)
less net interest payments to foreigners (iL + rD), where separate interest
payments on market loans (iL) and aid loans (rD) have been used. The
last term in equation 2 is the aid grants (Ag). The capital account balance
comprises net change in non-aid foreign debt (∆L0, having both private and
public component) in addition to the aid loan given in a year (Al) minus the
repayment of principal on the aid loans (Ar) which is known as amortization.
Here subscript t denotes year.
Separating the factors of aid from equation 2 and 3 and rearranging these
three equations yields:
Agt +A
l
t −Art︸ ︷︷ ︸
AID Inflows
= ∆Rt− [(Xt −Mt) +Wt − (itLt−1 + rtDt−1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
NACAB
− ∆L0t︸︷︷︸
NAKAB
(4)
where NACAB is the non-aid current account balance and NAKAB is the
non-aid capital account balance. The aid inflows are the sum of grants and
loans less the repayment.1 Thus an increment in net aid inflow, either grant
or loan, can affect the economy in the following ways. It can:
1. Enhance the international reserves;
2. Increase the non-aid current account deficit through net imports of
good and services;
3. Finance the payments of interest on foreign debt (both aid and non-aid
debt);
4. Finance a reduction in private transfers; and
5. Raise non-aid capital outflows (capital flight).
Realistically, aid will not have any counterpart in increased consumption
or investment if the aid dollars are entirely utilized for augmenting foreign
reserves or financing capital outflows. Hence, under conventional condi-
tions, the most usual application of aid inflows, as a measure of the direct
resource transfer, is to finance a widening of the current account deficit.
Thus, absorption is the decline in the non-aid current account balance that
1This concurs with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) definition of net
Official Development Aid (ODA): net ODA = Agt +A
l
t −Art .
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is determinable to aid. More formally,
Absorption =
∆NACAB
∆Aid
. (5)
Berg et al. (2007) discussed how absorption predominately depends on cen-
tral bank decisions on reserve aggregation and on the interest rate, which
further acts upon the demand for private sector imports. Some exceptions
to central bank dominance of aid inflows are aid-in-kind, aid given directly
to the government for buying imported goods and services and aid directly
given to NGOs, in which case the aid is fully absorbed. Interestingly, there
is no event of absorption for the grant of debt forgiveness. However, such
exceptions are quite irregular, leaving the majority of the decisions on ab-
sorbtion of the aid inflows to the central bank.
2.2 Spending
Utilizing national account identities, spending catches the magnitude by
which the aid inflow is utilized to finance an increase in government expen-
diture or a decrease in taxation. Using fiscal side definitions,
Fiscal Balance = Gt − Tt −At −Domestic Finance, (6)
which makes
Fiscal Deficit = Gt − (Tt −At), (7)
where G is the government expenditure, T is the domestic revenue and A
is the aid inflows. Now deducting aid inflows (A) from the both side of the
equation 7 yields,
Non-Aid Fiscal Deficit (NAFD) = Gt − Tt. (8)
Hence, with an increment of net aid inflows, governments can either
1. Reduce domestic revenues,
2. Increase government expenditure, or
3. Reduce domestic borrowing.
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Thus, spending is the decline in the non-aid fiscal deficit that is determinable
to aid. More formally,
Spending =
∆NAFD
∆Aid
.
Although aid sometimes comes as non-fungible project assistance, govern-
ments can take the decision whether or not to enhance the overall fiscal
deficit as aid increases, which is largely the settlement of the fiscal authori-
ties.
2.3 Spending and Absorption
Since spending and absorption are dealt with by different authorities, spend-
ing will be different from absorption, if perfect agreement and co-ordination
are absent, although there are some cases such as aid in kind and aid ded-
icated to finance government import, in which spending will be equal to
absorption. Such cases do not have any effect on macroeconomic variables
such as the exchange rate, interest rate and price level (Aiyar et al. 2005),
but other than such obvious examples, the policy response to the aid inflows
results in different combinations of spending and absorption, providing var-
ious macroeconomic consequences. In line with Dudine et al. (2008), a brief
summary of such consequences of spending and absorption is expressed be-
low.2
The spending and absorption of aid are the same when the widening of the
current account deficit acts in line with the fiscal deficit. In this case, the
increased fiscal net demand is fulfilled by increasing net imports. However,
there are cases where absorption will be higher than spending if central bank
authorities decide to sell more foreign exchanges associated with increased
aid inflows than is necessary. Such increases in the sell of foreign exchanges
are utilized to finance domestic debt which has occurred as a result of higher
government spending. This leads to sluggish monetary growth, appreciated
real exchange rate, lower inflation and reduced interest rate. The end re-
sult will be increased private consumption and higher domestic investment,
2Berg et al. (2007) and Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) discuss the macroeconomic conse-
quences of various combinations of spending and absorption in detail.
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which may increase net imports.
In contrast, spending could be greater than absorption when central bank
authorities decide to sell fewer foreign exchanges associated with increased
aid inflows than is necessary. In this case, fiscal deficit increases due to
higher government spending, but aid is accumulated to build the central
bank’s foreign reserves. Fiscal authorities are financing the widening of
fiscal deficit through domestic borrowing, which results in a depreciated
real exchange rate, higher inflation and a greater interest rate. This leads
to lower consumption and private investment, and tends to shift resources
from the private sector to the public sector; thus, spending will be greater
than absorption.
The total net foreign aid disbursed by donor countries has increased over the
years, but this has been followed by growing aid volatility in both the an-
nouncement and disbursement of aid (Aslam and Kim 2007). ? have demon-
strated that macroeconomic management of poor, aid-dependent countries
becomes extremely difficult with the high level of volatility in aid inflows.
They find that aid disbursements have typically been pro-cyclical, indicating
the failure of aid as a stabilizer or as an insurance against large macroeco-
nomic shocks (for example in case of natural disasters). As a result, it might
be optimal for the recipient countries not to utilize all the increments in aid
inflows at once, but to smooth them over time. Similarly, when capacity
constraints are stark or the level of inflation is high, large government ex-
penditures due to aid surge might use up the productive capability of the
economy and exacerbate pressure on inflation. A temporary policy of ab-
sorbtion but not spending could therefore help countries to reduce inflation
or the high level of domestic debt to a position where aid can be used without
harming macroeconomic stability. Likewise, in the case of low international
reserves, a temporary strategy could be to employ part of the aid increments
to build up a reserve buffer that would facilitate spending for countries that
are facing aid volatility.3
Recent literature on absorption and spending of aid inflows uses both nar-
rative and empirical approaches to understand the macroeconomics of aid.
Leading this literature is the seminal work by Berg et al. (2005) in which
3Such strategy has been termed as ‘pre-cautionary savings’ in Aslam and Kim (2007).
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they used a small number of elaborated case studies of countries that have
recently experienced prominent scaling-up in actual aid inflows. The study
finds that, spending is typically greater than absorption for the aid recipi-
ent countries, resulting in the domestic expenditure being higher than the
net imports. Extending this approach, Foster and Killick (2006) also drew
the same conclusion. Improving on Berg et al. (2005), Aiyar and Ruth-
bah (2008) systematically analyzed the spending and absorption of actual
aid, using the econometric analysis of a cross-section of countries. They
employed dynamic a panel data framework to estimate both short-run and
long-run absorption and spending. The work of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008),
in principle, supports the conclusion of Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and
Killick (2006), which contradicts the conventional view of full spending and
absorption.
A subsequent study on the programmed use of aid increases was included in
the IEO (2007) report. This study finds that programmed spending and ab-
sorption in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries under the PRGF-supported
program is rather limited. However, the paper only used same-year use of
aid increases, which made the paper’s conclusion questionable. Further to
the IEO (2007) study, Dudine et al. (2008) used a new and comprehen-
sive database for all countries with PRGF arrangements to estimate the
programmed use of aid. They concluded that PRGF allows countries to
smooth the use of almost all increments of aid inflows over time. Contra-
dicting the finding, a recent study by Hansen and Headey (2009) argues that
absorption is somewhat equal to spending in the case of small developing
countries. They also observed that aid is neither spent nor absorbed in any
systematic manner by the non-aid dependent countries. Hence the literature
draws mixed conclusions on the actual and programmed use of aid inflows by
recipient countries, and improved methodology and a comprehensive dataset
is required to draw a cohesive conclusion on this issue.
3 PRGF Aid Program
In September 1999, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) established the
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), replacing the Enhanced
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The aim of the PRGF is to make
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the reduction of poverty and the enhancement of economic growth the fun-
damental objectives of the lending operations of the IMF in its poorest
member countries. The principal features of the PRFG program, as stated
in PDR (2000) are:
1. Broad participation and greater ownership,
2. Embedding the PRGF in the overall strategy for growth and poverty
reduction,
3. Budgets that are more pro-poor and pro-growth,
4. Ensuring appropriate flexibility in fiscal targets,
5. More selective structural conditionality,
6. Emphasis on measures to improve public resource management/accountability,
and
7. Social impact analysis of major macroeconomic adjustments and struc-
tural reforms.
Each year during the period 1999-2007, a PRGF program was in place for
25 to 40 countries; typically a three year program which usually set macroe-
conomic targets for the medium term. Under this arrangement, successive
economic reports were presented to the Board of the IMF: the first when
a country requested a PRGF program and subsequently when performance
under the program was evaluated. This program evaluation, known as ‘Pro-
gram Review’ was typically carried out by IMF country offices every six
months. Program reviews included both fiscal and balance of payments
projections and a set of program conditions. Such quantitative national in-
come and balance of payments projections were coherent with the intended
policies of the government authorities and supported by the IMF. The pro-
gram conditions were placed to ensure two objectives: tracking the progress
in enforcing the intended policies of the government authorities and ensur-
ing the set conditions were met to unlock the schedule disbursements by the
IMF. These conditions and policies continue to be in force today for PRFG
programs.
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Program projections and conditions implicitly determine the use of the an-
ticipated aid inflows and are termed ‘programmed use of aid’ in this study.
This program generally sets a base on the build-up of international reserves
and a cap on some measure of the fiscal deficit or fiscal financing, thus de-
termining the capacity by which projected aid can be utilized to finance
higher net imports and fiscal spending. However for many reasons, the ac-
tual use of aid may be substantially different than was planned under the
PRGF. Even when program conditions are met, the actual fiscal and cur-
rent account deficit could be greater (or smaller) than the projection. Such
deviation could arise, for example, if capital inflows are different from what
was expected, or if unanticipated aid shocks (positive or negative) occur. A
mechanism is included in the program design to automatically adjust the
program conditions in adapting the unexpected aid inflows. Hence, most
programs permit greater spending in aid windfalls and do not require lower
spending in aid shortfalls.
In measuring the aid inflows, this study takes a practical approach by includ-
ing all official net transfers and loans under the concept of aid, since from
a macroeconomic perspective, aid is the transfer of resources from donors
to recipient countries. Aid may take several forms, such as both grants and
loans, budget support and non-fungible project financing, which may not
be channeled through the government budget in the recipient country. To
calculate aid inflows, net official borrowing is added with official transfers
and grants, and the interest payments to official creditors are deducted from
the sum. Furthermore, the flow component of alleged ‘exceptional financing’
is also added to the accounting of the aid inflows.4 Hence, this study com-
putes aid inflow on a cash basis to appropriate the net transfer of financial
resources from donors to recipient countries.
4 Methodology
Following the IEO (2007) and Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) approach, the
following models have been used to capture the absorption and spending of
4Exceptional financing is the part of debt relief that is not used for clearing arrears.
Such financing is available to pay for imports or debt services.
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aid:
∆NACAB i,t = α1 + β1∆AID i,t +
K∑
k=1
δ1kXk + γYear t + µ1i + i,t (9)
∆NAFD i,t = α2 + β2∆AID i,t +
K∑
k=1
δ2kXk + γYear t + µ2i + i,t. (10)
Where i denotes the country, t denotes time (which is uniquely ranked and
based on the date the document was published) and ∆ denotes the differ-
ence between the programmed level and actual level. For example, the term
∆NACABi,t can be elaborated as NACABi,t(programmed)−NACABi,t−1(actual).
Continent-specific dummies are used to capture the unobserved time inde-
pendent constant effect (µi) as Putman (1993) and Acemoglu et al. (2001)
argued that current political, social and economic institutions of many coun-
tries have largely been determined by their past history, geography and reli-
gion. Also, all the regression estimations have year-specific dummies which
have accommodated the year-specific variation in the model. Xk is a vector
of control variables of size K.
Similarly, we used the following alternative models in levels to estimate the
fraction of the aid inflows that is programmed to be absorbed and spent
over time:
NACAB i,t = α3 + β3AID i,t +
K∑
k=1
δ3kXk + γYear t + µ3i + i,t (11)
NAFD i,t = α4 + β4AID i,t +
K∑
k=1
δ4kXk + γYear t + µ4i + i,t. (12)
Here, the parameters of interest are βs since they capture the short run
absorption and spending of aid inflows. One may argue that the dependent
variables of the aforementioned equations also depend on their past values.
In that case, we need to use the lag dependent variable as a regressor to
capture the level of persistency in the regression. Such inclusions convert
the above equations into Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) models. In the case
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of absorption and spending, the equations become,
∆NACAB i,t = α5+β5∆AID i,t+ρ5∆NACAB i,t−1+
K∑
k=1
δ5kXk+γYear t+µ5i+i,t
(13)
∆NAFD i,t = α6+β6AID i,t+ρ6∆NAFD i,t−1+
K∑
k=1
δ6kXk+γYear t+µ6i+i,t.
(14)
Likewise, by introducing the lagged dependent variable as regressor, the
alternative models in levels become
NACAB i,t = α7+β7AID i,t+ρ5NACAB i,t−1+
K∑
k=1
δ7kXk+γYear t+µ7i+i,t,
(15)
NAFD i,t = α8 + β8AID i,t + ρ8NAFD i,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
δ8kXk + γYear t + µ8i + i,t.
(16)
Here ρs capture the level of persistence of the lagged dependent variable.
To test the hypothesis of cross-sectional independence in panel-data mod-
els with small T and large N, we employed semi-parametric tests proposed
by Friedman (1937) and Frees (1995, 2004) as well as the parametric test-
ing procedure proposed by Pesaran (2004).5 Results of these tests showed
evidence of contemporaneous correlation across the units. We also found
evidence of group-wise heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the er-
ror terms (using a modified Wald test and Wooldridge test). To estimate
equations 9 to 12, we used the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS)
method with correction for panel specific AR1 process (within panels) and
heteroscedasticity (across panels).
Equations 13 to 16, on the other hand, cannot be consistently estimated
using FGLS or OLS due to the presence of lagged dependent term as one of
the regressors. Due to the endogenous nature, the lagged dependent variable
is correlated with the error term of the estimation which creates a large-
sample bias in the estimation (Nickell 1981). Estimation bias could also arise
if the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the regressors, even if the
5We used xtcsd routine in STATA, developed by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) to
check such assumptions in STATA.
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error process is i.i.d. However, if the error process is autocorrelated then the
problem becomes even more serious (Baum 2006). To address such problems,
an application of General Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator, proposed
by Blundell and Bond (1998), is utilized where they suggested to use a
system of equations using lagged levels as well as lagged differences for the
DPD estimations.6 These equations differ in their moment conditions and
the set of instruments used. Here, predetermined and endogenous variables
(in first difference) are instrumented with lags of their own levels. Similarly,
lags of own first difference are used to instrument the predetermined and
endogenous variables (in levels). A detail description and application of the
Blundell and Bond (1998) estimator can be found in Roodman (2006).
5 Data and Variables
5.1 Data description
The dataset is available from the IMF website and contains data from staff
reports of all PRGF programs that have been approved over the 1999-2007
period.7 In the dataset, each observational unit is the country and un-
der each unit there are document-specific data for different variables. The
dataset is an unbalanced panel based on the data from 369 program doc-
uments of 51 developing countries. As explained in Section 3, a program
document has the record of projections and actual data that were formally
agreed upon with the authorities and presented to the Board of the IMF.
Ranging from 1996 to 2010, the dataset contains actual data from the oldest
document (1999) to three years’ projections for the most recent documents
(2007). Some variables in the dataset are collected from the World Eco-
nomic Outlook (WEO) to control for other variables that are not generally
reported in the program documents (for example, data on terms of trade
and PPP-adjusted real per capita GDP).
In the dataset, aid is constructed using both a national accounting and
balance of payments approach. The variable ‘fiscal-aid’ is constructed as
6Blundell and Bond’s system estimator, also known as ‘System GMM’, is an extension
of the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator.
7It contains the staff reports on the request and reviews of the PRGF programs.
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the net foreign financing including grant, debt relief and the flow compo-
nent of exceptional financing. The ‘bop-aid’ is derived by adding changes
in liabilities to official creditors (disbursements − amortization) to official
current transfers and capital transfers with the programmed financing gap,
increases in external arrears, rescheduling and other balance of payments
or fiscal supports. External interest payments are then deducted from this
amount.
The fiscal deficit net of aid is constructed from the difference between ex-
penditures excluding interest payments and revenue excluding grants. The
current account deficit net to aid is derived by excluding official current
transfers and interest payments from the current account balance. Both aid
and the fiscal and current account deficits are expressed as a share of GDP.
The details of the data collection process, the countries and documents used
to construct the dataset are well documented in Dudine et al. (2008).
5.2 Control Variables
For the spending regressions, we controlled for the lagged changed in fiscal
deficit (net to aid), lag of overall fiscal deficit, real GDP growth and the lag
of the inflation rate. The first control variable is used to capture the indirect
effect of past aid on the current fiscal deficit (net of aid). Inclusion of this
variable also captures the concern of the fiscal authorities in keeping the
level of deficit stable. The lag of overall fiscal deficit captures the concerns
about fiscal consolidation. A negative coefficient implies that the greater the
overall fiscal deficit in the past, the lower the programmed fiscal deficit net of
aid. Real GDP growth controls for the cyclicality of fiscal policy. A negative
coefficient entails higher deficit is programmed when economic growth slows
down. Finally, the lag of inflation rate captures the impact of fiscal policy on
internal macroeconomic stability; thus, a negative coefficient implies that as
past inflation is higher, the larger is the programmed reduction in the fiscal
deficit.
Similarly, for absorption equations, we controlled for lagged change in the
current account deficit (net of aid), lag of overall current account deficit, the
lag change in the term of trade, the change of overall fiscal deficit, per capita
GDP (relative to that of the US) and the lag of reserve coverage in term
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of months of import. The first control variable is utilized to capture the
indirect effect of past aid on the current account deficit. The lag of overall
current account deficit is employed for the same reason as described for the
overall fiscal deficit in the spending regressions. The lag change in the terms
of trade captures the concern about adjusting to past exogenous shocks. A
positive coefficient implies that past shocks are permitted to contribute to
the economy through an increase in current account deficit net of aid. The
change in the overall fiscal deficit is used to control for the demand pressures
created by the fiscal policy on the current account. Per capita GDP controls
the vulnerability; the higher the per capita income of a country, the more
resilient the country is to shocks. A positive coefficient implies that a larger
increase in the current account deficit is programmed for countries with high
per-capita income. Finally, the lag of reserve coverage is used to capture
the external stability, particularly reserve adequacy. A positive coefficient
means that a greater increase in the current account deficit is programmed
for those countries where the reserve accumulation is sufficiently large. All
these control variables are expressed in percentage of GDP. Exceptions are
made for terms of trade, inflation, per-capita GDP and reserve coverage,
which are expressed in respective appropriate units.
6 Estimation results
The estimation results suggest that the PRGF program supports the full use
of aid over time. In this section we will discuss simple and elaborate models
to address various dimensions of the use of aid. Note that in all regression
analysis, outliers are detected and excluded following the criteria used in
Dudine et al. (2008). A footnote under each table describes the rule used to
delete the outliers.
6.1 Absorption, Spending and Smoothing of Aid Increase
Table 1 reports the programmed absorption of aid increase, whereas Table
2 reports the programmed spending of aid increase with various regression
models. These sets of models are employed here to replicate the results of
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the IEO (2007) with better dataset and improved estimation techniques. Al-
though our preferred estimate is the Blundell-Bond GMM estimation (Model
6), we still used other models to check the robustness of our estimations.
To capture the amount of smoothing, the lagged change in aid is included
in the regression. Such control variables are appropriate to estimate the
programmed widening of the current account deficit (or fiscal deficit), which
is influenced by the use of the aid changes that were not absorbed (or spent)
in the previous year and a positive coefficient of the lagged change in aid
implies the smoothing of the aid inflows.
The regressions in Table 1 suggest that immediate absorption of aid inflow
is 59 percent, whereas Table 2 shows that the immediate spending of aid
inflow is 68 percent. Such findings contradict the IEO (2007) which found
that approximately 27 percent of aid increase is spent and some 64 percent is
absorbed immediately. However, our results are in line with the conclusion
by Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008), in which they found that spending is higher
than absorption. Controlling for other factors, our results remain stable.
Our regressions also provide evidence of smoothing in both absorption and
spending estimations. Model 3 of the absorption regression shows that 26
percent of the expected increase in aid is programmed to be absorbed in
the first programming year, whereas the coefficient on the lagged increase in
aid indicates that 14 percent of the past increase in aid is to be absorbed in
the programming year. Similarly, Model 3 of the spending regression shows
that 72 percent of the aid increase is programmed to be spent immediately
and about 27 percent is programmed to be utilized in the following year.
[Table 1 and 2 about here]
Controlling for other variables suggests that concerns for fiscal instability
and reserve inadequacy can weaken the programmed absorption and spend-
ing of aid. Likewise, we find evidence of difference in spending and ab-
sorption for countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The coefficient of the
interaction term between SSA and aid increase suggests that spending and
absorption is significantly higher for the countries that belong to SSA areas.
An alternative method for examining the smoothing of the use of aid is to
use the cumulative increase of the programmed fiscal deficits (or current
account deficit) over a two-year period and the projected increase in aid
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over the same period. In the case of spending, the regression confirms that
the spending of aid over a two-year period is more than 81 percent (Table 2,
Model 5). This finding is quite important since it shows that fiscal deficits
are programmed for a time horizon that is longer than one year. Similarly,
for absorption the regression indicates that the absorption of aid over a
two-year period is about 56 percent (Table 1, Model 5).
In our preferred regression for both spending and absorption, we find weak
evidence for the smoothing of aid use. One reason for this finding could
be the use of only positive changes in aid in the regressions, which provide
partial and quite plausibly misleading results of the regressions. In the next
subsection, we will relax such restrictions.
6.2 Absorption, Spending and Smoothing of Aid
Restricting the sample for only positive changes in aid provides a partial
and misleading scenario of the use of aid. In the case of aid volatility,
consideration of the treatment of both aid increase and decrease should
be included to correctly understand the use of aid. Aid volatility elicits
the question as to weather the programmed response to changes in aid is
symmetric. To answer this question, we looked at both directions of the
changes in aid inflows.
[Table 3 and 4 about here]
Table 3 and Table 4 present the regression for absorption and spending
respectively. Model 3 of the absorption regression suggests the smoothing of
the programmed use of aid, where approximately 48 percent of aid increase
is programmed to be spent instantly and approximately 13 percent of the
past increase in aid is to be absorbed in the current programming year. This
makes the eventual absorption ratio about 62 percent. Similarly, Model 3
of the spending regression shows evidence of smoothing of aid, as some
44 percent of aid increase is programmed to be used immediately, whereas
roughly 33 percent of the past increase in aid is to be spent in the current
programming year, making the eventual spending ratio 78 percent.
To control for the symmetric use of aid, we used an interaction term between
the expected change in aid with a dummy variable that takes a value of one
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if the expected change in aid is negative. Our regressions indicate that in
the case of absorption, the aid decreases are treated asymmetrically to aid
increases since the interaction term is significant and negative. The negative
sign of the interaction term suggests that if aid is expected to fall over the
course of the program, the programmed contraction of the current account
deficit net of aid is smaller than the expansion that is permitted during
aid increments. However, in the case of spending, such asymmetry does
not exist. Furthermore, in the two-year horizon model (Model 2 in Table
3 and 4) we did not find any evidence of asymmetric use of aid. Findings
of symmetric treatment of aid increases and decreases in the longer policy
horizon could be driven by the expected stability of future aid flows.
In spending regressions, we found evidence that higher past overall fiscal
deficit decreases the programmed change in fiscal deficit, and the significant
coefficient of the lagged change in the fiscal deficit indicates the importance
of stabilizing the deficit over time. Similarly, inflation has a considerable
effect on the programmed change of fiscal deficit net of aid. In spending
equations, we found significant association of reserve coverage and terms of
trade with the change in the current account deficit net of aid, where both
of these variables widen the programmed current account deficit.
6.3 Actual Absorption, Spending and Smoothing of Aid
Tables 5 and 6 report the various models used to estimate the absorption,
spending and smoothing of the aid use by employing the actual rather than
the programmed data of spending and absorption. This analysis will help
in understanding the behavior of actual spending and absorption of aid
compared with the programmed spending and absorption. The result for
absorption (Model 8 in Table 5) suggests that actual absorption of the aid
is about 28 percent with no evidence of smoothing of aid. This absorption
rate is lower than the estimated programmed absorption found in previous
subsections.
[Table 5 and 6 about here]
The result of the actual spending of same year use of aid is about 86 percent
with marginal significant evidence of smoothing of aid over the years. The
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eventual spending ratio of actual spending becomes more than 100 percent,
which is consistent with the findings of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008). One rea-
son for these findings could be the certain aid-financed capital expenditures
that might create a need for additional expenditures in each consecutive
period.8 However, our findings of absorption are completely opposite to the
findings of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) but are in line with the findings Berg
et al. (2007), which indicate that aid can be sometimes be spent but not
absorbed.
To understand the influence of the PRGF program on countries’ actual
spending and absorption, we introduced an interaction term between aid
and a dummy variable that is equal to one in those years the country is
under a PRGF program. Our results suggest that the presence of a PRGF
program does not seem to influence the actual spending and absorption
of aid (row two of Model 9 in Tables 5 and 6). Furthermore, we control
for the aid surprise, which is defined as the increments in aid that were
not predicted during the programming period. Our preferred estimations
(Model 10 of Tables 5 and 6) could not find any significant difference in the
spending and absorption pattern of aid in case of aid surprise. Similarly,
fiscal consolidation and reserve adequacy seems to have no significant impact
on the actual spending and absorption of aid.
Finally, to realize the relationship between actual and program aid, we em-
ployed Figures 1 and 2. The pictures suggest that generally IMF programs
have a tendency to understate program aid inflows in case the level of aid is
below average. However, the situation tends to reverse when the level of aid
is higher than average. In this case, the programmed aid inflows are over-
stated compared with the actual inflows of aid. This observation remains
true for both the fiscal and BOP data.
6.4 Absorption, Spending and Smoothing using levels of Aid
Tables 7 and 8 represent the estimations of spending and absorption of aid
using levels of data (as a percentage of GDP) rather than the differences.
These estimations are done as a robustness check to our previous estima-
8For example, an aid-funded hospital might require perennial government expenditure
on nurses and doctors, or a road may require repeated maintenance and repair costs.
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tions. By using the actual and programmed data for levels of aid flows, the
regression coefficients measure the fraction of aid inflow that is absorbed
and spent over time.
Once again, our preferred models are Models 4 and 6 in both tables which
employed the Blundell and Bond GMM estimations otherwise known as Sys-
tem GMM techniques. The estimated programmed absorption is approxi-
mately 46 percent in contrast with estimated actual absorption of about 34
percent. Coherent with the earlier estimations of this study, the estimated
actual absorption is found to be lower than the programmed absorption.
Model 6 of Table 7 also reveals that past current account deficit has sig-
nificant positive association with the programmed year’s current account
deficit net of aid, showing the persistent nature of the deficit in the balance
of payments.
[Table 7 and 8 about here]
The estimated programmed spending is approximately 74 percent, whereas
actual spending is some 97 percent. Consistent with the findings of the
previous subsection, we find that actual spending is higher than the pro-
grammed spending with evidence of smoothing of actual aid over time. The
long-run spending is estimated to be higher than 100 percent, which makes
the analysis coherent with the findings of earlier sub-sections. Furthermore,
we found evidence that higher past overall fiscal deficit decreases the actual
fiscal deficit of the program year.
7 Conclusion
Improving on Dudine et al. (2008), this study utilizes Blundell and Bond’s
System GMM estimator to provide consistent estimates of the programmed
absorption and spending of aid. However, the finding of the study should
be received with caution as the estimations may have suffered due to the
complexities of the issues and caveats resulting from the unavailability of
data and the presence of outliers for important variables over the period we
examined.
The study provides compelling evidence that PRGF-supported programs
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permit countries to utilize all increases in aid within a few years, demon-
strating smoothed use of aid inflows over time. In addition, our result reveals
that spending is higher than absorption in both the long-run and short-run
use of aid and shows evidence of the injection of liquidity into the domes-
tic economies of developing countries. Furthermore, the study finds that
the long-run spending exceeds the injected increase of aid inflows in the
economy. In contrast, we find weak evidence of profound influence of other
control variables on the spending and absorption of aid. Finally, the study
finds that the presence of a PRGF-supported program does not influence
the actual absorption or spending of aid.
We suggest the following policy implications as a result of this study. Since
macroeconomic considerations appear to have no influence over aid commit-
ments and disbursements, aid agencies should take account of the macroeco-
nomic stability of an economy, as aid is found to have significant associations
with balance of payments and national income accounting. Aid is some-
times received as non-fungible project assistance, which raises government
expenditure. Aid agencies should be cognisant of this type of assistance, as
governments may need to cut necessary consumptions to finance aid-funded
projects or may need to finance the expenditure from domestic borrowing.
Aid volatility is also a concern for recipient countries which leads govern-
ments to delay the immediate use of aid increments. Such volatility should
be reduced to improve the immediate use of aid.
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A Appendix: The Model
Extending from Dudine et al. (2008), this framework proposes a simple
model under which the spending and absorption equations in differences are
compatible with the same equations in levels (and vice-versa).
Because the equation in difference considers the difference between the pro-
grammed and the actual (lagged) level of variables, whereas the equation
in level considers only the programmed level of variables, any model that
attempts to make these two equations compatible must include, implicitly
or explicitly, both an equation that explains the actual values of the vari-
ables, and an equation that explains how expectations about the exogenous
variables are formed.
The model proposed in this note allows coherency between the programming
equation and the equation that explains the actual. Also, this model allows
maintaining a richer description of spending and absorption, which includes
the possibility of smoothing and the serial dependence of the endogenous
variable to its lagged values.
Lets denote Y pi,t as the programmed level of the endogenous variable for
country i at time t (which is uniquely ranked and based on the date when
the document was published). Note the endogenous variables are current
account deficit net of aid or the fiscal deficit net of aid, in percent of GDP.
Let Y ei,t be the expected level and Yi,t be the actual level of such variable
for country i for at t. Similarly, Xpi,t, X
e
i,t and Xi,t are respectively the pro-
grammed, expected and actual level of aid for country i at time t. Finally, let
Zi,t be a vector of explanatory variables and ui,t a zero-mean independent
and identically distributed error term. We introduce µi as the country spe-
cific time invariant effect. Thus the equations in levels for the programme
can be expressed as:
Y pi,t = β0 + β1X
p
i,t + β2Xi,t−1 + β3Zi,t−1 + θYi,t−1 + µi + ui,t. (17)
Assume that the actual level of the endogenous variable is described by the
following model:
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Yi,t = α0 + α1Xi,t + α2Xi,t−1 + α3Zi,t + λYi,t−1 + µi + εi,t (18)
where εi,t is a zero-mean independent and identically distributed error term.
Note when an IMF program is designed, the realization of εi,t, the actual
level of aid Xi,t and the actual level of the exogenous variables Zi,t are not
known. Hence programmed and expected values are used which makes the
above equation as
E[Yi,t] = Y
e
i,t = α0 + α1X
e
i,t + α2Xi,t−1 + α3Z
e
i,t + λYi,t−1 + µi (19)
where E[εi,t] = 0. Assume that the programmed level of aid is exogenously
determined whereas the expectations about the level of the exogenous vari-
ables are based on the past realization of these variables.9 Lets use the
following equation:
Zei,t = ϕ+ ρZi,t−1 + ψi,t (20)
where ψi,t is a zero mean error term. If we plug equation 20 into 19 and
rearrange the terms, we obtain
Y ei,t = α0 +α3ϕ+α1X
e
i,t+α2Xi,t−1 +α3ρZi,t−1 +λYi,t−1 +µi+α3ψi,t. (21)
Which is our equation in levels (equation 17) provided that β0 = α0 + α3ϕ,
β1 = α1, β2 = α2, β3 = α3ρ, θ = λ and ui,t = α3ψi,t.
To obtain the equations in differences and purging the country specific fixed
effect, we first use equation 18 to obtain Yi,t−1. Then we subtract the Yi,t−1
from the both side of the equation 21 to obtain
Y ei,t − Yi,t−1 = α3ϕ+ α1(Xei,t −Xi,t−1) + α2(Xi,t−1 −Xi,t−2)
−α3(ρ− 1)Zi,t−1 + λ(Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2) + α3ψi,t − εi,t−1.(22)
9This is fairly sensible assumption since creditors’ aid commitments are generally
known with a fair amount of precision at the beginning of a programming period.
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Hence, re-parameterizing the above equation, we can rewrite as
Y ei,t − Yi,t−1 = γ0 + γ1(Xei,t −Xi,t−1) + γ2(Xi,t−1 −Xi,t−2)
+γ3Zi,t−1 + δ(Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2) + ωi,t. (23)
Here γ0 = α3ϕ, γ1 = α1, γ2 = α2, γ3 = −α3(ρ − 1), δ = λ and ωi,t =
α3ψi,t − εi,t−1.
This model allows to identify possible estimation problems. For instance,
from ωi,t = α3ψi,t − εi,t−1, we can see that the error term of the equation
in difference is correlated with one of the regressors, namely Yi,t−1 − Yi,t−2
which is corrected by using dynamic panel data estimation techniques in the
regression estimation.
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B Appendix: Estimation Results
Figure 1: Actual and programmed aid inflows in the same year (BOP cal-
culations)
Figure 2: Actual and programmed aid inflows in the same year (Fiscal
calculations)
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Table 1: Regression result for the absorption of aid increase, unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6‡
Increase in ∆Current account deficit (net of aid)
∆Aid 0.392*** 0.322*** 0.262*** 0.128* 0.587***
(0.043) (0.063) (0.055) (0.073) (0.158)
∆Aid(t−1) 0.113*** 0.142*** 0.0591 0.092
(0.033) (0.029) (0.038) (0.110)
∆Aid averaged over two years 0.563***
(0.107)
∆Current account deficit (net of aid)(t−1) 0.010
(0.122)
Overall current account(t−1) -0.0485*** -0.0731*** 0.053
(0.019) (0.022) (0.080)
∆ log of terms of trade(t−1) 0.124 -0.200 5.993*** 3.390
(0.878) (0.948) (2.172) (5.436)
∆Overall fiscal deficit 0.0184 0.0206 -0.011
(0.016) (0.018) (0.032)
PPP-GDP per capita (in $US) 0.0698 0.249** 0.177 0.294
(0.072) (0.102) (0.110) (0.439)
Coverage(t−1) 0.003 0.0300 0.250*** 0.267
(0.076) (0.077) (0.091) (0.449)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) 0.875* 4.600* 3.913
(0.524) (2.373) (5.053)
Asia (1 if belongs to Asia) 0.220 -0.913** -0.477 6.254** 3.298
(0.570) (0.374) (0.404) (2.434) (4.300)
Europe (1 if belongs to Europe) -1.986** -2.982*** 4.135*
(0.865) (1.065) (2.377)
(Aid)x(SSA) 0.0868***
(0.025)
Constant 1.147*** -0.424 0.875 6.956*** -13.287*** -5.624
(0.188) (0.704) (0.754) (1.355) (7.622)
No. of observations 130 130 99 99 93 128
No. of. countries 30 30 25 25 28 40
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%,
**5%, *10%. In model 1 to 4, the sample is restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10, −10 < ∆Current
account deficit (net of aid)(t−1)< 10. In model 5, the sample is restricted where 0 < ∆Aid < 10 and −20 <
∆Current account deficit (net of aid)(t−1)< 20. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over
identifying restriction is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
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Table 2: Regression result for the spending of aid increase, unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6‡
Increase in ∆fiscal deficit (net of aid)
∆Aid 0.673*** 0.690*** 0.722*** 0.650*** 0.679***
(0.048) (0.053) (0.058) (0.066) (0.225)
∆Aid(t−1) 0.302*** 0.266*** 0.242*** 0.576
(0.035) (0.033) (0.039) (0.621)
∆Aid averaged over two years 0.819***
(0.076)
∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)(t−1) -0.399
(0.444)
Overall fiscal deficit(t−1) -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.318
(0.020) (0.022) (0.276)
Real GDP growth -0.0594 -0.0804** -0.230*** 0.456
(0.037) (0.039) (0.045) (0.604)
Inflation(t−1) -0.0146 -0.0153 -0.101** 0.025
(0.014) (0.014) (0.044) (0.127)
(Aid)x(SSA) 0.0693**
(0.028)
Asia (1 if belongs to Asia) -1.416*** -1.796*** -0.695 -0.607 -0.190 0.918
(0.188) (0.408) (0.453) (0.471) (0.204) (28.507)
Europe (1 if belongs to Europe) -2.290*** -2.350*** -1.497*** -1.328***
(0.227) (0.398) (0.458) (0.484)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) -1.147*** -0.649 -1.056** -1.523*** -1.130** -9.204
(0.204) (0.383) (0.453) (0.518) (0.510) (22.336)
Constant -0.106 0.238 (0.453) 1.807*** 3.130 0.952
(1.109) (1.029) (0.453) (0.534) (2.156) (22.927)
No. of observations 150 150 142 142 85 157
No. of. countries 36 36 35 35 22 43
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%,
**5%, *10%. In model 1 to 4, sample is restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10, ∆Aid(t−1)> −10,
−10 < ∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)(t−1)< 10 and Overall fiscal deficit(t−1)< 20. In model 5, the sample is
restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10 and −20 < ∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)(t−1)< 20. ‡Dynamic panel
data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and
AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
30
Table 3: Regression result for the treatment of increase and decrease in aid
(absorption), unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3‡
∆Current account deficit (net of aid)
∆Aid 0.432*** 0.483***
(0.052) (0.140)
∆Aid(t−1) 0.089*** 0.138**
(0.018) (0.067)
(∆Aid)x(dummy aid decrease) -0.241*** -0.827***
(0.085) (0.274)
∆Aid averaged over two years 0.420***
(0.042)
(∆Aid averaged)x(dummy aid decrease) -0.034
(0.056)
∆Current account deficit (net of aid)(t−1) 0.017
(0.042)
Overall current account deficit(t−1) -0.125*** -0.042
(0.018) (0.118)
∆ log of terms of trade(t−1) -0.108 0.703 3.659*
(0.684) (1.529) (2.054)
∆Overall fiscal deficit 0.005 -0.001
(0.004) (0.012)
PPP-GDP per capita (in $US) 0.193*** -0.039 0.076
(0.038) (0.126) (0.201)
Coverage(t−1) 0.079** 0.360*** 0.345*
(0.035) (0.076) (0.204)
Dummy aid decrease -0.188 0.684*** -1.909**
(0.195) (0.238) (0.789)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) 1.712*** 0.178 0.163
(0.360) (1.257) (2.109)
Asia (1 if belongs to Asia) 1.292*** 0.313 0.486
(0.328) (1.061) (1.737)
Europe (1 if belongs to Europe)
Constant -0.365 -5.311** 2.232
(0.760) (2.249) (4.197)
No. of observations 261 139 263
No. of. countries 41 31 44
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Sig-
nificance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 to 2, sample is restricted to observations
where −10 < ∆Aid < 10, −10 < ∆Current account deficit (net of aid)(t−1)< 10. ‡Dynamic
panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and
no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
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Table 4: Regression result for the treatment of increase and decrease in aid
(spending), unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3‡
∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)
∆Aid 0.482*** 0.446**
(0.024) (0.169)
∆Aid(t−1) 0.114*** 0.335***
(0.020) (0.061)
(∆Aid)x(dummy aid decrease) -0.288*** 0.124
(0.056) (0.361)
∆Aid averaged over two years 0.652***
(0.072)
(∆Aid average)x(dummy aid decrease) 0.103
(0.098)
∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)(t−1) -0.271***
(0.092)
Overall fiscal deficit(t−1) -0.096*** -0.083**
(0.012) (0.039)
Real GDP growth -0.027 0.113 0.124
(0.018) (0.098) (0.150)
Inflation(t−1) -0.020** -0.038 -0.085**
(0.008) (0.034) (0.033)
Dummy aid decrease -0.691*** 0.318 -0.570
(0.132) (0.327) (0.414)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) -0.445 0.269 0.327
(0.617) (2.582) (0.533)
Asia (1 if belongs to Asia) -0.191 -0.062 0.216
(0.613) (2.612) (0.555)
Europe (1 if belongs to Europe) 0.059 2.175
(0.658) (2.697)
Constant 0.996 0.680 -2.556***
(0.761) (2.702) (0.929)
No. of observations 291 196 295
No. of. countries 45 38 49
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Sig-
nificance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 and 3, sample is restricted to observations
where −10 < ∆Aid < 10, ∆Aid(t−1)> −20 and −10 < ∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)(t−1)< 10.
In model 2, the sample is restricted to observations where −10 < ∆Aid < 10. ‡Dynamic
panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and
no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
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Table 5: Regression result for the actual absorption of aid, unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8‡ Model 9‡ Model 10‡
∆Current account deficit (net of aid)
∆Aid 0.129** 0.146** 0.124 0.047 -0.008 0.278*** 0.643
(0.057) (0.061) (0.111) (0.083) (0.184) (0.084) (0.453)
(∆aid)x(program dummy) 0.042 0.077 -0.456
(0.119) (0.213) (0.971)
Surprise aid 0.068 -0.011 0.284
(0.060) (0.060) (0.224)
Expected aid 0.117*** 0.237*** 0.366
(0.017) (0.021) (0.459)
∆Aid(t−1) -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.007 0.121 0.252** 0.039
(0.044) (0.046) (0.021) (0.097) (0.119) (0.605)
∆Current account deficit (net of aid)(t−1) -0.408** -0.467** -0.405
(0.160) (0.210) (0.667)
Overall current account deficit(t−1) -0.152*** -0.176*** -0.173*** -0.383 -0.573 -0.320
(0.040) (0.038) (0.035) (0.387) (0.490) (0.836)
∆ log of terms of trade(t−1) -3.309* -2.945* -4.623*** -1.667 -1.849 15.985
(1.730) (1.720) (1.197) (16.187) (14.165) (27.103)
∆Overall fiscal deficit 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.101*** 0.105 0.111 0.058
(0.029) (0.029) (0.019) (0.074) (0.098) (0.121)
PPP-GDP per capita (in $US) -0.001 -0.002 0.005*** 0.004 0.008 0.019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.023) (0.046)
Coverage(t−1) -0.164* -0.047 -0.097 -0.735 -0.717 -2.085
(0.088) (0.099) (0.129) (0.937) (1.399) (3.826)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) 1.023 1.042 -1.350*** 2.600 -1.331 -1.725** 0.633 4.513 5.455 3.155
(2.891) (2.941) (0.454) (2.242) (0.883) (0.812) (0.739) (10.499) (16.476) (24.095)
Asia (i if belongs to Asia) 1.182 1.135 -1.080** 2.973 -2.488** -2.458** -1.255 -2.966 -1.661 0.432
(2.904) (2.960) (0.519) (2.247) (0.970) (0.965) (0.838) (15.018) (19.476) (16.931)
Europe (1 if belongs to Europe) -2.378 -4.348 -3.929 -3.614
(2.892) (3.701) (3.819) (2.273)
Dummy for program 0.168 0.742 -11.551
(0.251) (0.766) (8.278)
Constant -0.769 -0.719 9.156*** -4.937** 3.082 3.833* -1.669 1.945 2.509 -5.990
(3.031) (3.077) (1.897) (2.378) (2.910) (2.049) (1.243) (13.722) (22.186) (39.888)
No. of observations 198 198 198 98 142 142 82 367 367 202
No. of. countries 44 44 44 31 35 35 27 45 45 45
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 to 7, the
sample is restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction
is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
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Table 6: Regression result for the actual spending of aid, unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8‡ Model 9‡ Model 10‡
∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)
∆Aid 0.342*** 0.313*** 0.064 0.679*** 0.570*** 0.857*** 0.451
(0.069) (0.068) (0.092) (0.083) (0.208) (0.281) (0.324)
(∆Aid)x(program dummy) 0.371*** 0.083 0.529
(0.092) (0.220) (0.368)
Surprise aid 0.297*** 0.387*** 0.446
(0.030) (0.050) (0.374)
Expected aid 0.214*** 0.401*** 0.336
(0.025) (0.050) (0.325)
∆Aid(t−1) -0.012 -0.000 -0.034 0.340* 0.291* -0.345
(0.037) (0.047) (0.032) (0.198) (0.166) (0.390)
∆Fiscal deficit (net of aid)(t−1) -0.547*** -0.521*** -0.514**
(0.117) (0.103) (0.250)
Overall fiscal deficit(t−1) -0.367*** -0.368*** -0.650*** 0.068 0.090 0.038
(0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.060) (0.072) (0.042)
Real GDP growth -0.050 -0.041 0.005 -0.326 -0.441 -0.484
(0.048) (0.054) (0.058) (0.397) (0.457) (0.472)
Inflation(t−1) 0.012 -0.002 0.067*** 0.092 0.105 -0.107
(0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.127) (0.172) (0.337)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) 1.633* 0.432 0.324 -0.064 1.303 1.082 0.095 3.222 5.360 -18.695
(0.946) (0.323) (0.280) (0.567) (0.807) (0.667) (0.852) (6.626) (7.290) (39.593)
Asia (1 if belong to Asia) 1.146 0.026 -0.100 0.371 1.106 0.888 1.501* 8.462 8.933 -22.458
(0.945) (0.334) (0.303) (0.556) (0.817) (0.681) (0.875) (9.450) (9.923) (43.060)
Europe (1 if belong to Europe) -1.524 -1.664 3.044*** 3.355***
(1.136) (1.062) (1.140) (0.918)
Dummy for program 0.809*** 0.251 1.019
(0.206) (0.447) (1.220)
Constant -1.448 -0.300 -0.122 0.883 0.536 1.924* 1.040 -2.323 -3.777 17.791
(1.156) (0.860) (0.836) (0.831) (0.932) (1.131) (1.683) (5.963) (6.563) (37.992)
No. of observations 226 226 226 125 181 181 110 393 393 217
No. of. countries 48 48 48 39 43 43 35 51 51 50
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, **5%, *10%. In model 1 to 7, the
sample is restricted to observations where 0 < ∆Aid < 10. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction
is rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
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Table 7: Regression result for the absorption using level of aid inflows, unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Program Actual
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4‡ Model 5 Model 6‡
Current account deficit net of aid
Aid 0.850*** 0.779*** 0.903*** 0.462*** 0.399*** 0.337***
(0.023) (0.033) (0.018) (0.134) (0.028) (0.111)
Aid(t−1) 0.098*** 0.016 -0.275* 0.145*** -0.048
(0.034) (0.014) (0.152) (0.022) (0.230)
Current account deficit(t−1) 0.863*** 0.692**
(0.102) (0.277)
log of terms of trade(t−1) -1.790* 0.326 -1.551* -1.093
(0.920) (1.963) (0.863) (3.434)
Overall fiscal deficit -0.224*** 0.008 0.052** 0.129
(0.030) (0.023) (0.021) (0.103)
PPP-GDP per capita (in $US) 0.478*** 0.173 0.001 -0.002
(0.129) (0.284) (0.001) (0.010)
Coverage(t−1) -0.333** -0.073 -0.146 0.085
(0.138) (0.284) (0.098) (0.753)
Openess -0.034*** -0.018
(0.008) (0.017)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) -4.610*** -4.372*** 2.068 -0.618 -0.565
(1.133) (1.213) (1.887) (0.937) (12.181)
Asia (1 if belongs to Asia) -6.150*** -5.827*** -4.230*** 2.180 -2.789*** 2.792
(1.124) (1.207) (0.439) (2.261) (1.044) (10.758)
Europe (1 if belongs to Europe) -3.068*** -2.678** -2.402**
(1.182) (1.275) (1.044)
Constant 3.959** 3.575* 12.614*** -2.899 15.544*** 7.895
(1.842) (1.903) (4.830) (10.238) (4.028) (18.583)
No. of observations 364 364 211 216 411 409
No. of. countries 48 48 40 45 45 45
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%,
**5%, *10%. In model 1 to 3 and 5, the sample is restricted to observations where Current account deficit < 70.
‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is rejected and no evidence
for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
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Table 8: Regression result for the spending using level of aid inflows, unbalanced panel (1999-2009).
Program Actual
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4‡ Model 5 Model 6‡
Fiscal deficit net of aid
Aid 0.867*** 0.761*** 0.744*** 0.736*** 0.726*** 0.967***
(0.019) (0.028) (0.026) (0.125) (0.028) (0.157)
Aid(t−1) 0.147*** 0.150*** -0.030 0.211*** 0.191**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.080) (0.026) (0.075)
Fiscal deficit (net of aid)(t−1) 0.299*** -0.199***
(0.061) (0.062)
Inflation(t−1) -0.027*** -0.018 -0.015** 0.058
(0.009) (0.039) (0.008) (0.107)
Real GDP growth 0.078*** 0.386* 0.113*** -0.417
(0.026) (0.224) (0.032) (0.397)
Sub-Saharan Africa (1 if belongs to SSA) -1.240*** -1.621*** -1.049* -3.070 -0.703** -5.487
(0.395) (0.394) (0.569) (1.980) (0.329) (9.475)
Asia (1 if belongs to Asia) -0.627 -0.765* -0.211 0.092 0.263 -7.910
(0.423) (0.408) (0.572) (0.925) (0.282) (9.549)
Europe (1 if belongs to Europe) -0.286 -0.416
(0.751) (0.710)
Constant 1.521* 1.865** 1.466 -3.342* -0.026 4.230
(0.836) (0.804) (1.053) (1.903) (0.638) (8.893)
No. of observations 337 337 317 321 417 434
No. of. countries 46 46 46 50 51 51
Year specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%,
**5%, *10%. In model 1 to 4 and 5, the sample is restricted to observations where −20 <Fiscal deficit< 30 and
−5 <Aid inflows< 30.. ‡Dynamic panel data estimations where the Hansen test for over identifying restriction is
rejected and no evidence for AR(1) and AR(2) process after the estimation.
Source: International Monetary Fund Spending and Absorption data set 2008.
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Table 9: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
(Panel) (Between) (Within)
Program data
Bop aid 9.583 8.465 7.276 5.46 -12.812 78.975 2504
Fiscal aid 7.054 6.659 5.001 4.311 -11.497 59.831 1939
Fiscal deficit net of aid 6.099 7.585 4.562 5.89 -29.823 96.351 1930
Current account deficit net of aid 12.517 11.434 11.113 5.353 -15.602 89.102 2391
Fiscal deficit 2.871 10.812 2.748 10.439 -235.42 100.661 1930
Current account deficit 8.315 7.429 5.291 8.411 -19.6 63.4 2391
Actual data
Bop aid 9.069 9.174 7.297 5.701 -8.234 78.975 601
Fiscal aid 6.275 6.438 5.006 3.68 -8.714 52.048 523
Fiscal deficit net of aid 5.587 7.692 4.894 5.709 -18.895 62.602 521
Current account deficit net of aid 12.536 11.6 10.592 5.294 -15.602 69.837 577
Fiscal deficit 2.496 9.641 2.567 9.317 -125.41 67.833 521
Current account deficit 8.022 8.247 6.76 5.324 -19.6 51.799 577
Terms of trade 104.45 39.714 28.28 27.934 32.516 451.631 5370
Openess 74.506 37.197 35.149 8.834 29.75 205.654 4050
Real GDP growth 3.543 3.036 3.237 0.638 -4.605 10.632 4807
PPP-GDP per capita (in $US) 4.502 3.874 4.351 1.139 0.632 25.232 5535
Inflation 6.553 8.528 6.198 6.795 -8.4 141.9 2398
Gross international reserves 3.905 2.137 1.503 1.651 0 55 2271
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